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apart from the averaging scheme provided in the Code.59 For example,
a twenty-seven-year-old intern, anticipating that his peak income-
producing years would be between his fortieth and fiftieth birthdays,
could arrange to "sell" some of his expected income to a trusting indi-
vidual, receive a yearly payment for the next five or six years, and report
the consideration received as income in the years it was received. Since
he is presently an intern in a comparatively low income bracket for the
next few years, the taxes on these annual payments would be much less
than the taxes would be in later years when he has moved to a higher
bracket. The young doctor could save the consideration he received until
he reaches forty and be in exactly the same economic position as if he
were then earning the income, yet his overall tax liabilities would be
much less. Since Congress has established a comprehensive income av-
eraging scheme, 0 it is highly unlikely that it intended to leave room for
any private averaging schemes such as the one hypothesized. This
loop4hole may be available, however, after Stranahan.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.
Property Law-North Carolina's Marketable Title Act-Will the
Exceptions Swallow the Rule?
Shouts of jubilation from weary title examiners resounded through
dusty deed vaults in courthouses across North Carolina as news spread
of the enactment of a marketable title act' that would reduce the length
of title searches to thirty years. Initial joy was supplanted by disappoint-
ment, however, when a reading of the act, effective October 1, 1973,
revealed thirteen exceptions to the thirty year limitation.
2
Marketable title acts have evolved in answer to the major short-
coming of the recording system. When the common law maxim of "first
in time, first in right" yielded to the concept that he who first records
an interest in real property gains primacy over a subsequent recorder
of that interest 3 a title recordation system arose that preserved indefi-
5"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05.
Cold.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 47B (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
2Id. § 47B-3 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
'Payne, The Alabama Law Institute's Land Title Acts Project: Part I, 24 ALA. L. REV. 175,
181 (1971).
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nitely technical defects impairing marketability.4 As the chain of title,
originating by sovereign grant, adds new links, generation by genera-
tion, the likelihood that a defective transfer will occur increases with a
consequent expansion of the title examiner's time and energy in his
effort to discover it.
5
The obstacles encountered daily by title examiners illustrate the
need for remedial legislation to correct the imperfections of the record-
ing system. Ancient deeds, transcribed in longhand and difficult to read,
often contain references to natural monuments long since vanished or
to the lines of adjoining landowners that are now impossible to locate.'
Restrictions and encumbrances with no one in existence to assert them
are preserved, and interests such as possibilities of reverter or rights of
entry prohibit full enjoyment of property indefinitely.7 Facts extrinsic
to the record such as fraud or failure of delivery render titles insecure.8
Since no determination of title is conclusive, each successive grantee of
a tract must obtain expert assurance that the title is marketable.' The
inevitable result is the "flyspecking" that makes the title search a risky,
tedious, and expensive service. Finally, the transition from rural to
urban society, complemented by increased home ownership, mortgag-
ing, and business activity, compounds the frequency with which these
problems arise."0
4"Once an interest is placed on the books in the register's office, there is no existing method
to cleanse the records periodically of the barnacles of antiquated interests, however obsolete."
Webster, The Quest for Clear Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and Surer In North
Carolina via Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. REv. 89, 101 (1965). "The story is told that
in some counties across America, a clerk would record a recipe if it were acknowledgedl" Barnett,
Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. Q. 45, 86 (1967).
The North Carolina recording statutes were enacted in 1885 and are known as the Connor
Act, ch. 147, § 1, [1885] N.C. Sess. L. 1245. The relevant statutes are N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-18,
-20 (1966). These are pure race statutes because they protect "any purchaser for value of specific
land who records first, whether he has notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance or not, and
irrespective of whether he is a prior or subsequent purchaser." J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA 411 (1971).
5P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 171, at 366-67 (2d ed. 1970).
Defects include notarial and probate error such as the negligent omission of a spouse's signa-
ture or seal. Webster, supra note 4, at 97. The North Carolina General Assembly has recently
enacted a statute that prevents the failure to include the notation "seal" after a signature from
rendering a recorded document invalid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-108.11 (1973 Advance Legislative
Service, pamphlet no. 6).
OWhitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part I: How the Present System
Functions, 49 N.C.L. REv. 413, 425 (1971).
7Hicks, The Oklahoma Record Title Act Introduction, 9 TULSA L.J. 68, 68-71 (1973).
81d.
OBarnett, supra note 4, at 45-46.
"GHicks, supra note 7, at 69.
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Initial response to the conveyancing crisis came from the Iowa
legislature in 1919 in the form of a statute that extinguished claims
arising before 1900."1 The object of the Iowa act and the marketable title
legislation that followed was to simplify land transactions and to protect
purchasers of real property by making title examinations more secure.'
The labor and difficulty involved in conveyancing were reduced by re-
quiring examination of recent records only. 3 In 1945 the marketable
title concept gained momentum when Michigan adopted a prototype of
the Model Marketable Title Act. 4 Subsequently, thirteen other states
adopted similar legislation with varying degrees of sophistication and
adaptation to local need." In their operation these acts contain elements
of marketable title acts, curative acts, or statutes of limitation. 6
The North Carolina Act follows the pattern common to most mar-
ketable title legislation. 17 It requires examination of only recent records
and establishes a point in time, often called the root of title, that marks
the beginning of the chain. 18 If an owner presently has a record chain
of title for thirty years, all conflicting claims based on title transactions
prior to the thirty year period are eliminated. His title is marketable
"Ch. 270, § 1 [1919] Iowa Acts 316 (now IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17 (1950), as amended,
(Supp. 1973).
11L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION XV (1960).
131d.
"No. 200, §§ 1-9 [1945] Mich. Pub. Acts 267 (now MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 -. 109
(1948). Lewis Simes and Clarence Taylor of the University of Michigan School of Law through a
project with the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association
used the Michigan Act as the basis for the Model Act.
"5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-33(b) to -33(1) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 712.01-.10
(1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101 to -
S1110 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.17-.20, .29-.38 (1950), as amended, (Supp. 1972);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 565.101-.109 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page 1970); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 71-80 (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-30-1 to -15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (1953), as
amended, (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 601-06 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.15 (1966).
'8Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 106-07, 83 N.W.2d 800, 816 (1957). See text accompa-
nying notes 37-39 infra.
"The North Carolina Act originated from a draft by James A. Webster, Jr. of Wake Forest
University School of Law patterned after the Model Marketable Title Act. It has been presented
to the General Assembly several times since 1965. For an analysis of the proposed act, see Webster,
supra note 4.
""Real property transfers should be possible with economy and expediency. The status and
security of recorded real property titles should be determinable from an examination of recent
records only." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-1(4) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
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subject to (1) claims excepted from the operation of the act, 9 (2) all
encumbrances arising on or since the root of title,"0 and (3) ancient
claims, otherwise extinguished, that are preserved by re-recording them
with the register of deeds.2
1
The thirty year period used to establish the root of title under the
North Carolina Act falls between the minimum period of twenty2 and
maximum of fifty years adopted by other states. 2 The length of the
period is crucial because an excessively long period forfeits the basic
value of the act, and one that is too short increases the risk that too
many notices to preserve old interests will be filed.24 While most states
have adopted a forty year period,25 North Carolina's thirty year period
is commendable because the starting point in 1943 falls after the Depres-
sion when defective tax sales, foreclosures, and generally inferior con-
veyancing techniques left title records in great confusion. 26 Barring the
rare occasion when the root of title falls on a transfer recorded exactly
thirty years prior to the present transaction, the chain will begin at the
transaction next preceeding the thirty year period. 7 For example, if A
presently claims title under a grant from 0 recorded in 1913, and no
subsequent conveyances have occurred, A's root of title begins in 1913,
not 1943. Similarly, if 0 had conveyed to X in 1913, and A claims title
by deed from X recorded in 1953, A's root of title again begins in 1913.8
In its operation the statute incorporates a device that allows re-
recordation of interests that would otherwise be extinguished. To illus-
trate, consider the following example. 0 conveys Blackacre by deed
recorded in 1913 to X "so long as no tavern is constructed on the
property." In 1943 X conveys to A making no mention of the restric-
tion. In 1973 A's title is no longer subject to the 1913 prohibition. Had
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(l)-(l3) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
-Id. § 47B-3(l) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
21Id. § 47B-4 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
22N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
2IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1101 (Supp. 1972).
11L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at xxiv.
2'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(c) (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.1 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.48 (Page
1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-1 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 601
(Supp. 1973).
2"Payne, supra note 3, at 194.
2'Webster, supra note 4, at 107.
28Assume 0 gave a mortgage to M in 1943 and interest payments are still being made. If 0
sold the property to A in 1953, M should record a preserving notice in 1983 since it is A's thirty
year period that is crucial, not M's.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-2(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
[Vol. 52
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
the deed recorded in 1943 contained a reference such as "this convey-
ance subject to the restriction found in deed of 1913 recorded in deed
book 30, page 160 of Z county registry," the restriction would be pre-
served.30 A general reference in the 1943 deed such as "subject to
easements and restrictions of record" would fail to preserve the excep-
tion.3 1 Finally, if 0 desired to preserve his restriction, he could record
his claim with the register of deeds before October 1, 1976, and the
restriction would remain enforceable for thirty years and would be sub-
ject to re-recordation at the end of that period.1
2
Section 47B-5 which provides the owner of an interest recorded at
any time prior to 1943 a three year "transitional" period to re-record
and preserve that interest will become unnecessary after 1976. Without
this provision, however, the constitutionality of the act could bejeopard-
ized. As purely retroactive legislation it could impair contractual rights
and could deprive owners of their property without due process.13 This
section also provides those who do not follow legislative enactments
closely an adequate opportunity to learn of the legislation, and to re-
record their interests.
In addition to an understanding of the statute's general operation,
it is essential to examine its individual provisions. Section 47B-1 sum-
marizes the problems that have required marketable title legislation and
states the objectives of the act. The only substantive value of this salu-
tary provision is an affirmative identification of the legislative intent
which could bolster court opinion in subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion .34
Section 47B-2 affirmatively defines marketability and serves as an
orientation to the individual provisions of the act. It greatly reduces the
risk that an exception will be overlooked because it limits title examina-
tion to recent records.35 It provides a comprehensive definition of mar-
ketability, however, only in the sense that marketability is determined
by examination of instruments recorded during the restricted period.
-Id. § 47B-3(l) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
311d.
"Id. § 47B-5 (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3). An ethical question arises
whether an attorney, aware that a former client could lose a property interest, should advise of
this potential loss or should remain silent to avoid solicitation.
Since certain interests, such as possibilities of reverter and rights of entry unduly restrict
property enjoyment, perhaps a limit should be placed on the right to re-record.
"P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 175, at 384.
3Webster, supra note 4, at 103-04.
"Id. at 105.
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True marketability continues to depend upon the legality of those in-
struments and the interests created by them.36
Defining marketability in affirmative terms does, however, exem-
plify true marketable title legislation by expressly eliminating old incon-
sistent claims while statute of limitations acts do so only by implication
through barring a remedy.3 Subsection (c) which states that "all rights,
estates, interests, claims or charges whatsoever" that arose prior to the
root of title are extinguished carries this cleansing process one step
further and adds a curative provision to remove all doubt that old claims
are eliminated. Significantly, the incapacity of a claimant eligible to
assert an old claim will not prevent its elimination as a cloud upon
title.38 This is another improvement over acts that function as a statute
of limitations because the effectiveness of the act is more important than
the infrequent deprivation of property from one under disability."
Subsection (d) states that the establishment of marketable record
title pursuant to the act shall be prima facie evidence of ownership in
actions for the recovery of real property, to quiet title, or to recover
damages for trespass. This provision, unique among marketable title
acts, is in answer to a dilemma that typically arose in disputes over large
stands of timber in rural areas. Under preexisting law, a stranger could
move into a remote tract and begin to harvest the trees. In order to
prevent this practice judicially, the true owner was forced to institute a
trespass suit where validity of his title was essential to recovery."° Since
proof of a complete chain of title from the sovereign usually proved
impossible,4 violent remedies often replaced judicial ones.
Section 47B-3, which lists thirteen items excepted from the act's
coverage, radically departs from the pristine concept of marketable title
legislation that title transfer should be facilitated by reference to recent
records only. Each encumbrance excepted remains a cloud upon title
even if it arose prior to the root of title." While exceptions are charac-
31P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 172, at 371; L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 1I.
3P. BASYE, supra note 5, § 173, at 372. Under a statute of limitations a plaintiff loses a right
because he fails to sue within a designated time. Under a marketable title act the plaintiff loses
his right because he fails to file a preserving notice.
'8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-2(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"'Webster, supra note 4, at 115-16. Some might question the constitutionality of an act that
can extinguish the property rights of those under disability.
40E.g., Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C. 93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955).
""In an action for the recovery of land and for trespass thereon a denial by defendant of
plaintiff's title places upon plaintiff the burden -of proving title in himself and the trespass of
defendant." Cutts v. Casey, 271 N.C. 165, 167, 155 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1967).
12Barnett, supra note 4, at 86-87.
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teristic of all the marketable title acts,43 the greater their frequency, the
more drastic is the reduction of the act's utility.4
Subsection 47B-3(3), recognizing the right of those in present pos-
session, is the first actual exception.45 The precept that title searches
should be limited to recent records collides headlong here with the.
deference the common law accorded possession. Possession, absent.
marketable title legislation, has always been important because it may
ripen into full title under adverse possession and because possession
inconsistent with record title serves as constructive notice of an unre-
corded right."
Although this exception will require a trip to view the property in
addition to the record search,47 it serves two functions. First, inquiry into
possession protects the adverse possessor who has not relinquished pos-
session before marketability is established.4" Secondly, it hinders a
claimant who asserts title under a "wild deed".49 Assume that in 1913,
"See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(h) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.03
(1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1106 (Supp. 1972).
" Another problem marketable title acts are supposed to solve is that posed by
old recorded interests less than a fee simple, to which the title of the fee simple owner is
subject. . . . Easements, equitable servitudes, liens, mineral rights, leases, possibilities
or reverter, and powers of termination are typical examples. If the objective is to ease
the burden of title examination, no really sound argument can be made for cutting off
some of these interests disclosed only in the pre-root chain, unless all so situated are
cut off.
Barnett, supra note 4, at 86.
"Subsections (1), (2) and (10), although listed among the exceptions, are, in reality, descrip-
tions of the operation of the act.
"Barnett, supra note 4, at 60. In another statute relating to the possession of real property
with respect to color of title, the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly provided that by distinctly
marking the physical boundaries, by recording a survey, and by listing and paying taxes on the
property so marked, one can acquire prima facie evidence of possession. N.C. GEN. STAT. § I-
38(b)-(c) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38
(1966). This statute eliminates much former uncertainty for those claiming title by possession.
Other 1973 legislative innovations affecting real estate transfer include a statute preventing real
estate title insurance companies from providing information or insurance without a title examina-
tion and the opinion of a North Carolina attorney, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1973 Advance
Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 2), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1966), and another
providing that the tax collector's certificate of assessment is conclusive. The certificate removes
real estate taxes and special assessments as liens upon the property covered against those who rely
on the certificate by paying the taxes and assessments, purchasing or leasing the property, or
lending money secured by the real property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-361 (1973 Advance Legislative
Service, pamphlet no. 7), amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-361 (1966).
"Barnett, supra note 4, at 63-64; Webster, supra note 4, at 109-10.
"Webster, supra note 4, at 108.
"Id. at 109.
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O conveys Blackacre to X who takes possession and remains there until
the North Carolina Act is implemented in 1973. Assume further that
in 1915, Rascal, a stranger, purports to convey Blackacre to Y. Both X
and Y will have muniments of title that meet the statutory scheme and
give each marketable title, but an orthodox search by a purchaser from
X will fail to reveal the other independent chain. An inquiry that would
reveal the possession of X greatly reduces the likelihood that Y, holding
under a "wild deed" would prevail in asserting his false claim.
Subsection (4) requires an inquiry into the county tax records when
marketability is to be established and answers a second problem that
arises from the wild deed dilemma. If, under the previous set of facts,
X had moved from Blackacre in 1970, with Y moving in as soon as X
was out of sight, nothing would alert a purchaser from Y of X's superior
right. However, a check of the county tax records revealing that X
instead of Y paid the real property taxes would place the purchaser on
notice of the inconsistency and frustrate the "late squatter's" bid for full
title." Although wild deeds occur infrequently, their potential conse-
quences are so disastrous that an exception requiring inquiry into facts
extrinsic to the record is deemed justified.
Subsections (4) through (8) exempt interests, primarily easements
in favor of mining5 and railroad enterprises and water, sewage, gas,
electrical and telephone utilities, from the operation of the act. Here the
policy of the act arguably conflicts with the burden and expense accru-
ing to the holders of these vested interests should they be required to
re-record their claims every thirty years. It is also argued that the public
services provided by these entities entitles them to remain beyond the
operation of the statute52 and that their easements are usually intended
to remain permanently outstanding. 3 Although these compelling rea-
sons have prompted exceptions for easements in almost every marketa-
ble title act,54 the scope of the easement exception provision in the North
10Jd. at 110- 11.
Wild deeds also arise where a grantor executes a second unrecorded conveyance of the same
land. The situation is most apt to arise where one owner, through mistaken land description,
attempts to convey part of another's land. See generally Case Comment, Marketable Record Title
Act: Wild, Forged, and Void Deeds as Roots of Title, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 669 (1969).
51Although North Carolina is not a major mining state, the lack of specificity in the exception
for mining interests could prove troublesome. See Payne, supra note 3, at 186-93.
51Barnett, supra note 4, at 72.
5Id.
51E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-33(h) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.03(5) (1969);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1106 (Supp. 1972).
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Carolina act is its most serious impediment.
The rationale for extinguishing these interests far outweighs the
reasons for excepting them. No title examiner can certify a title unless
he checks the record for these interests back to the original grant, thus
undermining the purpose of the act.5 Also, the holders of these interests
are primarily large and sophisticated businesses knowledgeable in the
law and financially equipped to integrate the notice filing system into
their business operation. Even if the argument for exempting these
interests should prevail, only those easements observable by physical
inspection should escape the re-recordation requirement for, even under
general property law, non-observable easements that are unrecorded
cannot be asserted against a subsequent purchaser.57 Observable ease-
ments, however, are called to the vendee's attention when he inspects
the property as he is required to do under the present possession excep-
tion."
Subsection (9), excepting interests held by the United States, recog-
nizes that no property interest can be divested from the federal govern-
ment without its consent. Unlike the acts of several other states,"0 the
North Carolina act does not except interests held by the state. Subsec-
tion (11) excepts mortgages, deeds of trust, and security interests from
the statute's operation, and, like the easement exceptions, greatly re-
duces the act's utility. Since most security interests have a duration of
less than thirty years and are held by large financial institutions with
ample opportunity to adapt to the notice filing system, the advantages
accruing to these interests fail to warrant their exception from the thirty
year limitation.61
In theory, subsection (12), excepting interests registered under the
Torrens system, is compatible with the marketable title act concept
because it also facilitates safe land transfer. By registering the title to
land, instead of recording the evidence of title, the widespread use of
55Barnett, supra note 4, at 86.
5'Note, The Minnesota Marketable Title Act: Analysis andArgumentfor Revision, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 1004, 1016-17 (1969).
'Id.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(3) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
"Three United States Supreme Court cases have held that state recording statutes do not
apply to federal tax liens. United States v. Estate of Donelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970); United States
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389 (1916).
"E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.53(G) (Page 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-
30-13 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 601(b) (Supp. 1973).
aNote, 53 MINN. L. REV., supra note 56, at 1017.
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the Torrens system could make title transfer safer than marketable title
legislation. Since this laudable concept has found few adherents, how-
ever, its exception from the act will be significant only in the few eastern
counties that use it.
62
The last exception, subsection (13), excepts equitable servitudes
that restrict property to residential use. By including this exception,
preservation of uniform residential sections through equitable servi-
tudes, patterned to function like zoning ordinances, prevailed over no-
tions favoring individual aspects of private ownership and court reluct-
ance to honor titles encumbered by equitable servitudes. 3
Section 47B-4 details the procedure by which claimants of extin-
guishable interests must affirmatively re-record them. This provision
avoids deprivation of property without due process by preventing the
arbitrary extinction of property rights. 4 Practically, it serves to insure
that only stale claims encumbering title needlessly will be eliminated by
allowing "live" ones to be preserved. 5 Its diminution of the act's utility
is negligible because the claims re-recorded are still discoverable among
the recent records. Significantly, holders under disability can have their
claims re-recorded by others.66 Also, the claim must contain "the name
of any record owner of the real property at the time the notice is regis-
tered" and be recorded in the grantor index under that name.67 This
assures that a title search beginning with the root of title will uncover
the re-recorded interest. 6
12Whitman, supra note 6, at 460-61.
61Swietck, The Law of Restrictions on Land in Wisconsin, 41 MARQUETTE L. REV. 227, 337-
38 (1957). Mecklenburg County was influential in the exception of equitable servitudes from the
operation of the act since large residential areas surrounding Charlotte fall outside the city limits
and beyond the jurisdiction of city zoning ordinances. Residential uniformity is maintained by
incorporating restrictions in individual deeds.
"For a discussion of the constitutionality of marketable title legislation see L. SINIEs & C.
TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 253-92. The constitutionality of the original Iowa statute was tested
and upheld in Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941) and again in Tesdell
v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957). See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83
N.W.2d 800 (1957).
9"The proposed statute, in promoting the public interest that land should be made more freely
marketable and that the status of land titles should be more easily ascertainable, seeks to 'let the
dilatoriness of human nature take its toll' in extinguishing interests not seasonably re-recorded."
Webster, supra note 4, at 114. "It has been the experience of states with longterm marketable title
acts that few if any notices of claim are filed, thus indicating that few claims actually exist." L.
SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 4.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-4(a) (1973 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
671d.
6P. BASYE, supra note 5, at 376.
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The final four provisions provide stiff penalties for those who file
false claims under the act, 9 state that the act will not disrupt the opera-
tion of existing statutes of limitation, 7 define terms and those to whom
the act applies, 7' and conclude that the act should be liberally con-
strued.72
CONCLUSION
The General Assembly's response to the conveyancing crisis by
passage of the North Carolina Marketable Title Act will render invalua-
ble service to all involved in real estate transactions. "No other remedial
legislation which has been enacted or proposed in recent years for the
improvement of conveyancing offers as much as the marketable title
act. It may be regarded as the keystone in the arch which constitutes
the structure of the modernized system of conveyancing." 73 Prior to
passage of the act, the title lawyer had to choose either to extend his
search back to a remote period and reduce the risk that an undiscovered
exception would later arise to haunt him or to risk a shorter search and
save the valuable time that perusal of ancient records demands. Since
the latter approach generally prevailed,74 the new act will drastically
reduce the likelihood of liability by assuring prima facie fee title after a
thirty year search. The concept of marketability will be more clearly
defined and conform more readily to modern needs of title transfer. The
frequency of quiet title suits and the requirement of quitclaim deeds to
remove old encumbrances will be greatly reduced.
Unfortunately, the quest to assure victory for the marketable title
legislation resulted in the loss of major battles to vested interests and
the concession of numerous and broad exceptions to the thirty year
limitation. As the act is implemented, however, and its value to those
engaged in real property transfer is recognized, advocates of the market-
able title act should take up arms once again and attempt to remove
these impediments to the full utility of the act.
EDWARD S. FINLEY, JR.
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